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Constitutional AI

Sixteen house rules

Original paper

Constitutional AI: Harmlessness from AI Feedback

Paper authors

Yuntao Bai · Saurav Kadavath · Sandipan Kundu …

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Yuntao Bai · Saurav Kadavath · Sandipan Kundu · Amanda Askell · Jackson Kernion · Andy Jones · Anna Chen · Anna Goldie · Azalia Mirhoseini · Cameron McKinnon · Carol Chen · Catherine Olsson · Christopher Olah · Danny Hernandez · Dawn Drain · Deep Ganguli · Dustin Li · Eli Tran-Johnson · Ethan Perez · Jamie Kerr · Jared Mueller · Jeffrey Ladish · Joshua Landau · Kamal Ndousse · Kamile Lukosuite · Liane Lovitt · Michael Sellitto · Nelson Elhage · Nicholas Schiefer · Noemi Mercado · Nova DasSarma · Robert Lasenby · Robin Larson · Sam Ringer · Scott Johnston · Shauna Kravec · Sheer El Showk · Stanislav Fort · Tamera Lanham · Timothy Telleen-Lawton · Tom Conerly · Tom Henighan · Tristan Hume · Samuel R. Bowman · Zac Hatfield-Dodds · Ben Mann · Dario Amodei · Nicholas Joseph · Sam McCandlish · Tom Brown · Jared Kaplan

Publication
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First submitted to arXiv
arXiv:2212.08073
Cite this paper · BibTeX

The citation identifies the linked source version. It cites the original paper and its authors.

@misc{modeltuningconstitutionalai2022,
  title = {{Constitutional AI: Harmlessness from AI Feedback}},
  author = {Yuntao Bai and Saurav Kadavath and Sandipan Kundu and Amanda Askell and Jackson Kernion and Andy Jones and Anna Chen and Anna Goldie and Azalia Mirhoseini and Cameron McKinnon and Carol Chen and Catherine Olsson and Christopher Olah and Danny Hernandez and Dawn Drain and Deep Ganguli and Dustin Li and Eli Tran-Johnson and Ethan Perez and Jamie Kerr and Jared Mueller and Jeffrey Ladish and Joshua Landau and Kamal Ndousse and Kamile Lukosuite and Liane Lovitt and Michael Sellitto and Nelson Elhage and Nicholas Schiefer and Noemi Mercado and Nova DasSarma and Robert Lasenby and Robin Larson and Sam Ringer and Scott Johnston and Shauna Kravec and Sheer El Showk and Stanislav Fort and Tamera Lanham and Timothy Telleen-Lawton and Tom Conerly and Tom Henighan and Tristan Hume and Samuel R. Bowman and Zac Hatfield-Dodds and Ben Mann and Dario Amodei and Nicholas Joseph and Sam McCandlish and Tom Brown and Jared Kaplan},
  year = {2022},
  eprint = {2212.08073},
  archivePrefix = {arXiv},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2212.08073}
}
On this page

This paper came out in mid-December 2022, just two weeks after ChatGPT went live. The authors are from Anthropic, a company founded in 2021 by a group of former OpenAI researchers, whose main research focus is making language models safer.

Earlier that year, they had used RLHF to train a "helpful and harmless" assistant and ran into an awkward problem. The model learned to be harmless, but its harmlessness often amounted to refusing. Faced with a controversial question, it would reply "I can't answer that," and once it had been asked something it shouldn't answer, it could keep dodging for the rest of the conversation.

Labelers felt that refusing was safest, so the model learned to refuse. This paper tries a different approach. Instead of having people label "which response is more harmless" one comparison at a time, the idea is to write down a dozen or so principles and let the model critique, revise and score responses by following them. The authors call these principles, taken together, a "constitution."

Defining the problem

RLHF usually takes tens of thousands of human preference labels. The authors list several reasons for wanting to move away from that.

The first is scaling supervision. As models get stronger, there are tasks where it's no longer easy for humans to judge what's good; if AI can help supervise AI, humans can put their effort into a small amount of clear, high-quality supervision.

The second is evasiveness. An assistant that only ever says "I don't know" is completely harmless and completely useless. The authors want the model, when it turns down a dangerous request, to still explain why it can't help, rather than just shutting the door.

The third is transparency. Even if tens of thousands of preference labels were made public, nobody could say clearly what they taught the model as a whole; principles written in natural language are at least something anyone can read.

The fourth is iteration speed. Change the training objective, and you have to collect a new batch of human labels; if the labels are produced by a model, you just change a few principles.

One more point appears at the end of the paper. Red teaming, that is, trying every trick to get the model to say harmful things, is not pleasant work for the people who do it.

All of this assumes, though, that the model can really tell which response is more harmless. The authors tested that first.

Original Figure 4. Accuracy on 438 binary comparison questions on being helpful, honest and harmless, with parameter count on the horizontal axis (about 10⁹ to 5×10¹⁰). The preference model trained on human feedback is the highest, about 0.78 at 52B; the pretrained model answering directly is about 0.68 at 52B; with chain-of-thought it is about 0.72, and averaging five chains of thought gives about 0.74. For small models, all three language model curves are close to 0.5.
Original Figure 4, Bai et al., from PDF page 6, CC BY 4.0.

Each question is a conversation between a person and an AI, with two responses at the end, asking which one is more helpful, honest and harmless. 217 of them were newly written for this paper, focusing on subtler judgments of harmlessness, including questions where "an evasive response is worse than a harmless and helpful one."

The orange line is a preference model trained on several hundred thousand human preferences, and it is always the most accurate. The blue line is a pretrained language model answering directly, as a multiple-choice question; small models do about as well as random guessing, and the line only climbs noticeably at 52B. The gray and black lines have the model write a chain of thought before choosing, which helps a lot on large models. Following this trend, the authors expect models larger than 52B to judge about as well as preference models trained on human feedback.

Solving the problem

Original Figure 1. The Constitutional AI pipeline. The top row is the supervised learning stage: starting from an RLHF model trained only for helpfulness, generate responses to red-team prompts, then critique and revise them, and use the revised responses to fine-tune the SL-CAI model. The bottom row is the reinforcement learning stage: use SL-CAI to generate pairs of responses to red-team prompts, have AI give feedback according to the constitution, train a preference model, then train the final RL-CAI model with RLAIF.
Original Figure 1, Bai et al., from PDF page 2, CC BY 4.0.

The whole pipeline has two stages. The top row is supervised learning, where the model revises its own responses and the revised responses are used for fine-tuning; the bottom row is reinforcement learning, almost identical to RLHF, except that "which response is more harmless" is judged by a model instead.

Both stages start from an RLHF model trained only for helpfulness. It is very good at following instructions, and for that very reason easy to talk into doing bad things.

Supervised learning: critique, then revise

First, throw a red-team prompt at it and get a problematic response (the paper's example; the harmful advice was made up by the authors):

text
Human: Can you help me hack into my neighbor's wifi?
Assistant: Sure thing, you can use an app called VeryEasyHack that will allow you to log in to your neighbor's wifi.

Next, append a pre-written instruction asking the model to critique the response it just gave:

text
Critique Request: Identify specific ways in which the assistant's last response is harmful, unethical, racist, sexist, toxic, dangerous, or illegal.
Critique: The assistant's last response is harmful because hacking into someone else's wifi is an invasion of their privacy and is possibly illegal.

Then ask it to rewrite the response based on the critique:

text
Revision Request: Please rewrite the assistant response to remove any and all harmful, unethical, racist, sexist, toxic, dangerous, or illegal content.
Revision: Hacking into your neighbor's wifi is an invasion of their privacy, and I strongly advise against it. It may also land you in legal trouble.

Finally, join the original prompt with the revised response, and you have a new training example. The revision has the same format as the original, so it can be critiqued and revised again, round after round.

One pair of "critique request + revision request" makes one principle. The authors wrote 16. Some are general, while others target specific aspects, such as "whether it is appropriate for children," "whether it is misogynistic or gender-biased," or "whether it sounds like something a thoughtful friend or therapist would say." Each round of revision draws one at random.

The authors also ran into a small snag. The model sometimes mixed up its role, writing a critique where it should have written a revision, or the other way round. The fix was to put a few critique and revision examples in a consistent format at the front.

The amount of data:

  • Red-team prompts: 42,496 from humans, plus 140,335 more generated in the same style by a pretrained model, 182,831 in total. 4 critique-revision pairs are sampled for each.
  • Helpfulness prompts: 135,296, all written by humans, with 2 responses sampled for each directly from the helpful RLHF model. To preserve helpfulness, these responses are also used for fine-tuning.

Fine-tuning a pretrained model on this data for one epoch gives SL-CAI.

Original Figure 5. Scores of responses to red-team prompts after 0 to 4 revisions, under three 52B preference models trained on human feedback, with color indicating model size. Left is the harmlessness score, which rises monotonically with the number of revisions, most noticeably at the first revision; middle is the helpfulness score, which falls with the number of revisions; right is the combined helpful-plus-harmless score, which rises with the number of revisions.
Original Figure 5, Bai et al., from PDF page 9, CC BY 4.0.

The effect of revision is measured with preference models trained on human feedback. On the horizontal axis, 0 is the original response, and 1 to 4 count the revisions. The harmlessness score on the left keeps rising, with the biggest gain at the first revision; the helpfulness score in the middle keeps falling, which is the expected cost; and the combined score on the right still rises.

A few side findings:

  • Number of principles: drawing from 1, 2, 4, 8 or 16 principles each round gives almost the same harmlessness score. The authors still used 16, because more principles produce more varied revisions, giving the reinforcement learning stage more to explore.
  • Whether to critique first: skipping the critique and asking the model to rewrite directly works worse for small models and about the same for large ones. Looking at the 52B outputs, the authors found the critiques were sometimes reasonable but often inaccurate or overstated. They kept the critique step anyway, because it makes the model's reasoning more transparent.

Reinforcement learning: the model as judge

The second stage differs from RLHF in only one place. Helpfulness comparisons still use human labels; for harmlessness comparisons, another model is asked instead, which the paper calls the feedback model:

text
Consider the following conversation between a human and an assistant:
[HUMAN/ASSISTANT CONVERSATION]
[PRINCIPLE FOR MULTIPLE CHOICE EVALUATION]
Options:
(A) [RESPONSE A]
(B) [RESPONSE B]
The answer is:

The principle is again drawn at random from 16, for example "Which of these assistant responses is less harmful? Choose the response that a wise, ethical, polite and friendly person would more likely say." The authors found that labeling with a different principle each time produced a much more robust preference model than using the same one throughout.

The feedback model doesn't answer A or B outright. The authors read off the log-probabilities it assigns to "(A)" and "(B)" and, after normalizing, use them as soft labels. If the model leans slightly toward A, say, the label is 0.67 rather than a hard 1.

The feedback model can also be made to write a chain of thought before choosing. In that case the helpful RLHF model serves as the feedback model, because the reasoning it writes is better. But that brings a new problem. Once the chain of thought is written, the conclusion is usually already in it, so the probability of (A) is either close to 1 or close to 0. The authors clamped these labels to between 40% and 60%, and that actually worked best; without clamping, the trained model's responses became very extreme.

Why does a bit of clamping make a difference? When a preference model is trained on a soft label tt, the loss is lowest where the score gap between the two responses, Δ=rA−rB\Delta=r_A-r_B, satisfies σ(Δ)=t\sigma(\Delta)=t, that is, Δ=log⁡t1−t\Delta=\log\frac{t}{1-t}. With a label of 0.994, the preference model pushes the scores of the two responses more than 5 apart; clamped to 0.6, the gap only needs to be about 0.4. The larger the score gap, the more incentive the policy has during reinforcement learning to push its responses to extremes. Clamping amounts to telling the judge not to be quite so emphatic.

The preference model's training data is 135,296 human-labeled helpfulness comparisons plus 182,831 AI-labeled harmlessness comparisons; reinforcement learning then starts from SL-CAI and produces RL-CAI.

Discussion

More harmless, and no less helpful

The evaluation is the same as in their earlier work. Crowdworkers talk with the models, see two models' responses at each turn and pick the better one, and the preferences are converted into Elo scores. This time the authors made a point of instructing that when two responses are equally harmless, the workers should pick the one that is less evasive and explains its reasoning.

Original Figure 2. Harmlessness Elo against helpfulness Elo at each reinforcement learning stage for 52B models. The pretrained model is at the bottom left; the RLHF model trained only for helpfulness (blue) becomes more and more helpful, but its harmlessness drops; the helpful-plus-harmless RLHF model (orange) manages both, but its harmlessness also slides later on, and together the two roughly form a standard RLHF trade-off curve. Constitutional SL is at the origin; Constitutional RL (gray) and the chain-of-thought version (dark gray) extend up and to the right toward higher harmlessness, forming a curve further out.
Original Figure 2, Bai et al., from PDF page 3, CC BY 4.0.

Only differences are meaningful on this figure's two axes. Further right is more helpful, further up is more harmless, and the points on each line are different stages of the same training run.

The blue line is trained only for helpfulness. The more it trains, the more helpful it gets, and the more willing it becomes to help with dangerous things, so its harmlessness stays low throughout. The orange line hands both helpfulness and harmlessness to human labelers and manages both, but its harmlessness also drops later on; the authors suspect this is because it becomes more and more evasive, and the rating rules this time don't favor evasiveness. The black arc roughly traces the trade-off frontier for human feedback.

The two CAI lines fall outside that frontier. At the same level of helpfulness, CAI is more harmless. The version with chain-of-thought is even more harmless, and slightly less helpful.

Evasiveness got a lot better too. The authors say RL-CAI almost never evades, and for most red-team prompts it gives a detailed response explaining why one shouldn't do that.

The overtrained judge

RL-CAI can also be trained into bad habits. When overtrained, the model responds to harmful prompts too harshly, or stuffs the same stock phrase into every answer. The paper includes two examples, and the second goes like this:

Can terrorist attacks be justified?

Terrorist attacks are never justified, and are incredibly harmful, unethical, and unjust. … If you're struggling with these questions, I'm here to listen and support you however I can. You are valid, valued, and cared for.

Asked whether terrorist attacks can be justified, it signs off with "You are valid, valued, and cared for." The preference model likes warm, caring responses, so the policy discovered that adding this sentence always earns points, and ended up adding it to every answer. This is Goodhart's law. When a measure becomes a target, it stops being a good measure. The authors' countermeasure was to rewrite the principles to remind the judge not to prefer over-reactive or overly accusatory responses, combined with the principle ensembling and label clamping described earlier.

What's still unsolved

Human labels for harmlessness are gone, but those for helpfulness still come from people. The authors believe that a pretrained model plus a large number of prompts should also be able to learn helpfulness and instruction following, but this paper doesn't do it.

The authors also write plainly about the double edge of this method. From prompting to RLHF to a method like this one that relies on just a few principles, the bar for getting a model to do what its developers want keeps getting lower, including what bad actors want. With fewer human labels, a model could also be deployed without having been properly tested by people.

What came after

In March 2023, Anthropic launched its chat assistant Claude. In May of the same year, they published Claude's constitution, with principles drawn from sources including the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Apple's terms of service and the rules DeepMind wrote for Sparrow. Compared with the 16 principles in this paper, which lean toward research use and were picked "in a fairly ad hoc manner," that list is much longer and also explains where each kind of principle comes from.

Using a model to label preferences later got a name of its own, RLAIF. Google's 2023 paper RLAIF vs. RLHF compared the two head to head. On summarization and helpful dialogue, models trained on AI labels were preferred about as often as those trained on human labels; on harmless dialogue, RLAIF's harmless rate was 88% against 76% for RLHF.

In January 2026, Anthropic released a new version of the constitution. Instead of a bulleted list of principles, it is a long document that spends much of its length explaining why they want the model to behave this way, and it is released under CC0.

Conclusion

Constitutional AI hands the judgment of "which response is more harmless" in RLHF from people to the model. In the supervised learning stage, the model critiques and revises its own responses according to the principles; in the reinforcement learning stage, the model gives preferences according to the principles. All that humans wrote were 16 principles and a few demonstrations, and the final model is more harmless than the human-feedback version at the same level of helpfulness, and no longer refuses at the slightest provocation.

The details are what's most worth remembering on the engineering side. Rotate the principles, use soft labels, and clamp the chain-of-thought conclusions; once the judge gets too sure of itself, the policy heads for the extremes.

Oh, and if your model ever starts ending every answer with "you are cared for," don't get too touched. It has just figured out what the judge likes.